Firms buy and sell goods in a global marketplace. As this becomes increasingly true, understanding how firms differentially navigate this marketplace is critical to identifying which firms will ultimately succeed, and how investors should allocate capital amongst these firms. Success in this global setting depends not only on the goods or services that firms can provide, but also on the information networks that firms can access. We show that these networks have a first-order impact on the trade decisions undertaken by these firms, both in terms of imports and exports. We further explore how quickly the capital markets can separate the "strategic" importers and exporters from other firms. We show that the market appears to have a difficult time deciphering even openly observable channels.
Increasing exposure to foreign operations has been a consistent time-series trend in the United States. The Bureau of Economic Analysis's National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) broad measure of economy-wide firm profits shows that the percentage of NIPA national profits coming from overseas has increased from roughly 21% in 2000 to 38% in 2010 38% in (Hodge (2011 ). However, this is not simply a large firm phenomenon, as S&P 500 firms received 46% of their sales revenue from overseas in 2010, growing from only 30% ten years prior.
Yet although a large and growing number of public firms engage in international transactions, we have a limited understanding of why firms choose to trade with firms in certain countries, and how these decisions affect firm value.
To answer this question, we exploit variation in ethnic population breakdowns across states in the U.S. Specifically, we examine how residents' ties to their home-countries can play a role in creating bilateral trade linkages and whether (and importantly which of) these trade links are value-enhancing for firms.
We do this by focusing on the import and export activity of all US publicly-traded firms for the past fifteen years. We obtain import and export data through public records that must be reported by shippers, and then made publicly available through customs and port authorities. We use this data to ask the question of whether there are strategic trade decisions that a firm can make, given the immigration patterns that result in concentrated ethnic populations close to certain firms.
An example of our identification strategy is the following. Suppose we consider a firm located in California, where a common ethnicity is Chinese. We first test whether this firm is more likely to trade (either import or export) with a firm in China, than a firm located in Wyoming, where Chinese is not a common ethnicity. We hypothesize that local ethnicities may help lower the information barriers for local companies, and thus that firms may enjoy benefits from this local advantage. In addition, ethnic make-up may also proxy for local demand for a firm's goods, which can impact optimal importing decisions. We then test the value enhancement of these links.
We find evidence that firms export more to (and import more from) countries with which they have stronger information linkages. We measure firmcountry information networks as the share of residents in a firm's headquarters state that have the same ethnicity as the country to which the firm is exporting/importing (a variable we call "Connected Population"). A one standard deviation increase in connected population increases the amount the firm exports to (imports from) a country by 36%, t=3.67 (46%, t=3.65) . We also show that this increased importing (and exporting) provides a tangible benefit to the firm in terms of increased market share in their respective industries. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in "strategic trading" (i.e., trading to a country that has a large connected population in your state) increases marketshare by 0.30%, t=4.59, on a mean of roughly 2.4%.
We next go on to explore whether the market understands the value of the strategic use of information networks, and the resultant import and export decisions of firms. We find strong evidence that it does not. For instance, strategic importing firms outperform other firms in their state that do not exploit their networks by a risk-adjusted 96 basis points per month (t=4.61). The analogous outperformance for strategic exporters is 118 basis points per month (t=5.19). These correspond to risk-adjusted outperformance of 11%-14% per year. We also find similar outperformance when we compare strategic traders to other firms that export to (or import from) the same countries that strategic traders do, but who do not have the same access to a connected local population (outperformance ranging between 90 and 92 basis points per month (t=4.61 and 4.64, respectively)). Importantly, this outperformance is long-lived, is unaffected by known risk determinants, 1 and never reverses, suggesting that this strategic trading behavior is truly important for fundamental firm value, but is only gradually realized by the market.
We show that we can predict which trade links, on average, are valuable for firms using simple measures of connected population. Although these simple measures are publicly available, and easily observable, the market seems to ignore this information when setting the prices of these strategically trading firms. If the market correctly takes into account the value of the information networks for these importing and exporting firms, then whether or not all firms are optimally choosing levels, and directions, of trade, the market should impound this relevant information regarding this into prices. Instead, we find that the market consistently undervalues the impact of these information linkages for trading decisions, even based on a simple measure of connected population.
We run a number of tests to better establish our proposed mechanism. If it really is these information linkages that are increasing the amount of importing (and exporting) to the countries represented by the connected population, then we might expect that when these connections are more valuable, we should see these connections utilized more heavily. We test this in two ways. First, we look at the cutting of tariff controls amongst the US and a given connected country for a given product. Consistent with tariff cuts increasing the value of the information network connection, we see significantly more strategic trading by firms (i.e., trading to the country of the connected population) following the cutting of the tariff, but solely in the product where the tariff was cut. This is
1 The outperformance reported above are 4-factor alphas controlling for exposure to size, book-tomarket, and momentum. Non-parametric characteristic adjustments, liquidity adjustments, industry-adjustments to remove any industry specific component, etc. also have nearly no impact on the magnitude or significance of the return differences.
consistent with the variation in the value of the network causing variation in strategic trading. We also show that when the connected population's country has a positive GDP shock, again presumably increasing the value of connection, strategic exporting firms experience a significant increase in firm value.
Next, we dig deeper into the exact manner in which the information is transferred across the network, and thus profitably used by firms. While we cannot obtain the ethnic make-up of the entire employee base or management of all firms, we do collect the ethnic makeup of the firm's entire board of directors for all firms in our sample. From this data, we can identify one channel, through the board of directors, that this information network may be utilized. We first show that local ethnic population is a strong predictor of a board's ethnic makeup (i.e., if there is a larger Chinese population in a given state, the exporting/importing firm's board is significantly more likely to have Chinese board members). We then find that these "connected" board members have a large impact on the utilization (amount of trading), and value of the utilized information network. Specifically, when a strategic importer (exporter) has a connected board member on its firm board, it has significantly higher returns following its strategic import (export) decisions of 6.6% per year, t=3.12 (5.4%
per year, t=2.81).
Lastly, we show that in addition to market participants not fully realizing the value of the information network for strategic importing and exporting firms, sell-side analysts make the same mistakes. Specifically, analysts significantly underestimate the earnings performance of strategic importers and exporters (leading to significantly more positive earnings surprises of these firms).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a brief background and literature review. Section II describes the data, while Section III documents the impact of the connections on firm-level trade. Section IV establishes the returns to strategic importers and exporters that utilize these connected information networks. Section V provides additional tests of the information network mechanism tying firm-level trade decisions and returns to the connected population. Section VI concludes. Merton (1987) , Hong and Stein (1999) , and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) , argue that, in economies populated by investors subject to binding attention and resource constraints, delayed information flows can lead to expected returns that are not explained by traditional asset pricing models.
Subsequent empirical studies find evidence that is largely consistent with these models' predictions. For example, Huberman and Regev (2001) , Barber and Odean (2006) , DellaVigna and Pollet (2006) , Hou (2006), Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007) , and Cohen and Frazzini (2008) , Huang (2011), and Nguyen (2011) find that investors respond quickly to information that catches their attention (e.g., news printed on the New York Times, stocks that have had extreme returns or trading volume in the recent past, and stocks that more people follow), but tend to ignore information that is less salient yet nonetheless essential to firm values. In addition, Cohen and Lou (2011) Automated Manifest System, Piers' own reporters located in 88 major ports in the U.S., and foreign partners whose national Customs authorities provide comparable data. A bill of laden is a legal document between the shipper and the carrier that outlines the type, quantity and destination of the good being carried. Our data includes standard information provided on bill of laden and value added fields such as content (HS Code level) and the value of the cargo, both of which are estimated by Piers. We match Piers data to public firm names using shipper (for exports) and receiver (for imports) firm names using name matching algorithms. Table I reports the firm characteristics of public firms that import and export. Table II reports the top 10 destination and target ports for imports and exports.
We obtain state level ethnicity data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census.
The ethnicity information in the Census is based on self-identification questions in which residents choose their origin(s) or descent(s). In our study, we group ethnicities in eight broad categories: Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Korean, Indian, Vietnamese, Hispanic, or White.
We determine the nationality of corporate board members using biographical information provided by BoardEx of Management Diagnostics
Limited, a private research company specialized in social network data on company officials of US and European public and private companies.
We obtain We obtain data on migrations to the U.S. from Global Bilateral Migration Database, which is provided by the World Bank. This database contains information on "stock" of immigrants in a given country based on "foreign-born concept" and is updated every decade. Using this database, we identify the number of immigrants to the U.S. from every other nation as of the beginning of 1990 and 2000. According to this database, the United States is home to more than 20% of the world's migrants and is the top destination for migrants for more than 60 countries.
III. The Impact of Connections on Firm-Level Trade

A. Import and Export Decisions of Firms
We first test the hypothesis that firms export more to (and import more from) countries with which they have stronger information linkages. We measure firm-country information networks as the share of residents in a firm's headquarters state that have the same ethnicity as the country to which the firm is exporting/importing (a variable we call "Connected Population"). The dependent variable in our tests is a firm's import/export behavior in a given year. Specifically, for each firm in each year we compute its "Export Ratio" as the total amount a given firm exports to a destination country in a given year scaled by the total amount of exports by all U.S. public firms in the same year to that same country (E ict /Sum(E ct )). 2 We define "Import Ratio" analogously for imports. All export and import figures are converted to U.S. dollars, and represent the dollar value of exports and imports by a given firm.
In Table III we present results from a panel regression of firm-level export and import behavior on firm-country information networks, plus a host of fixed effects. The unit of observation in these regressions is firm-country-year, and all standard errors are clustered at the year level. Panel A presents the results with Export Ratio as the dependent variable; each specification shows that Connected Population (CP ct) is a positive and significant predictor of a firm's country-level export share. We add fixed effects for firm, year, and ethnicity in Column 2, and ethnicity and firm-year in Column 3. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient of 0.798 (t=3.67) on CP ct in Column 3 implies that for a one-standard deviation increase in CP ct , a firm's Export Ratio increases by 0.30%; relative to a mean Export Ratio 0.84%, this implies a 36% increase, which is large in magnitude.
Panel B presents the identical set of tests using Import Ratio as the dependent variable. As in the export tests, we find that ethnic information links are strong positive predictors of firm-level import behavior. The magnitude of this effect is again large: the coefficient of 0.852 (t=3.65) on CP ct in Column 3 implies that for a one-standard deviation increase in CP ct , a firm's Import Ratio increases by 0.32%, which this translates into a 46% increase (when compared to the mean Import Ratio of 0.70%).
2 If we use the firm's total exports across all countries in a given year as the denominator, we find similar results.
Importantly, when we redefine our measure of ethnic information links using a firm-level measure based on board of director nationalities, rather than Census-level data on local population characteristics, we find similar results. For example, in place of the Connected Population variable, we compute a variable called "Connected Board Member," which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a board member whose nationality is the same as the target country.
The Panel A Column 3 coefficient estimate using this new connection measure is 0.203 (t=3.67), which is again both statistically and economically significant.
B. Tariff Analysis
In our next set of tests, we exploit exogenous shocks to the value of firmcountry linkages. In particular, we use product-level data on imports for the firms in our sample, and identify situations where country-specific tariffs on these types of goods are either cut or raised. Thus our tests are similar to those in Table III , except that they are now run at the product level, and hence the unit of observation in the regressions is the firm-product-country-year. In addition,
we include a few new variables designed to measure the impact of tariffs, for example a variable called "Cut," which is a dummy equal to 1 if the country in question cut a tariff on the specific product in question during a given year; and also the interaction term between tariff cuts and firm-country information links (Cut*Connected Population). We define a similar set of variables for tariff increases ("Jump," equal to 1 if a target country imposes or increases a tariff on a given product). Since tariffs only bind for imports, we only run these tests using the Import Ratio as the dependent variable. Table IV presents the results of these tests. Specifically, we run panel regressions of import ratios on firm-country information links, plus the tariff variables described above, plus various fixed effects including firm, year, ethnicity, and firm-product-year. As expected, the coefficient on Cut is positive and significant, indicating that firms increase their share of imports for a given product when tariffs are lowered. More interesting, however, is the coefficient on the interaction term Cut*Connected Population in Column 3, which is positive and significant (=0.153, t=6.35) even after controlling for ethnicity and firmproduct-year fixed effects, suggesting that firms increase their import share of firm-country linked products especially in years when tariffs are cut. We find negative but insignificant effects for tariff increases, and the interaction between tariff increases and firm-country links, respectively.
Taken as a whole, the results in this section demonstrate that firms export (import) significantly more to (from) countries with which they have stronger information linkages. Both effects are economically large, and indicate that firms exploit their information networks when making their trade decisions. Further, at times when particular products are most attractive (such as after a tariff cut), the impact of these information linkages on product-level import behavior is most pronounced.
IV. Strategic Importers/Exports and the Returns to Information Networks
In this section we build on the results above, and ask to what extent do firms benefit from using their firm-country networks in their import and export decisions. For example, one could imagine firms overweighting certain countries in their import and export decisions due to a form of familiarity bias; alternatively one might expect firms to tilt their trading focus as a result of superior private information about certain countries.
We try to disentangle these two possibilities by examining the future outcomes of firms that exploit their firm-country linkages in their trading Hispanic, Chinese, Indian, Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, Philippine, and White;
we then match these ethnicities to countries as shown in Appendix Table 1 .
Because some firms will trade with only 1 country across a given time period, and others will trade with many, the number of possible "informed" or "linked"
shipments each month will vary by firm. Using our set of flagged firms, we compute the total number of months with shipments to each county. We add up the number of linked monthly shipments and divide it by total monthly shipments; if this ratio is greater than 90%, we call the firm a "Strategic
Exporter." Our results are robust to using various thresholds (e.g., 95%, 85%, 80%, and 75%). We define Strategic Importers analogously but using imports rather than exports.
A simple example helps to clarify our approach. Consider two firms: A and B. Firm A is located in a state where the population of Chinese, Indian, and Hispanic residents is above the U.S. median. Meanwhile, Firm A exports a significant amount (defined as "above the median export-to-revenue ratio in its industry") to China, India, and Mexico, in each month over the prior year. In addition, in two months in particular, Firm A exported a significant amount to Italy (where the firm has no ethnic "link"). Thus, since 34 out of 36 shipment months (=94%) are to linked countries, Firm A is called a strategic exporter. By contrast, Firm B is located in the same state, but exports a significant amount to both China and Italy in each month of the prior year; thus, since only 12 out of classified as a Strategic exporter.
We then examine the future stock returns and real outcomes of these strategic exporters (and importers). First we compute calendar-time portfolios where we go long strategic exporters, and short various combinations of nonstrategic exporters. Table V presents We form our short portfolio in two ways. First, in Panel A, the short portfolio includes the set of non-strategic exporters that are located in regions without a strong ethnic link to a particular country, and yet choose to export to that country anyway. For example, the comparison here might be between a strategic exporter located in Wisconsin (which has an above-media Indian resident population) exporting a lot to India, compared with a non-strategic exporter located in Wyoming (which does not have a large Indian resident population) who also chooses to export to India. In Panel C, the short portfolio includes the set of non-strategic exporters who have a strong ethnic tie to a particular country, and yet choose to export to a different country. For example, the comparison here might be between a strategic exporter located in Wisconsin (which has an above-median Indian resident population) exporting a lot to India, compared with a non-strategic exporter that is located in Wisconsin, but that chooses to export to Japan (an ethnicity that is not above-median in the state of Wisconsin). 3 The short portfolios in Panels B and D are defined similarly but use imports in place of exports.
Panel A of Table V indicates that a portfolio strategy that buys strategic exporters and shorts non-strategic exporters as described above earns large abnormal returns. The equal-weight four-factor alpha on this long-short portfolio, using a one-year holding period, is 92 basis points per month (t=4.64);
the corresponding value-weight four-factor alpha is 65 basis points (t=2.29).
Meanwhile the long-short DGTW-adjusted returns are 57 basis points (t=2.84), Collectively, the calendar-time portfolio results in Table V indicate that strategic exporters and importers earn large abnormal returns relative to their non-strategic counterparts. This result suggests that these firms are not overweighting certain countries in their import and export decisions due to a form of familiarity bias, but rather as a result of superior private information about certain countries. Further, the market does not seem to recognize the advantage of these types of strategic export/import decisions by firms, as the mimicking portfolios in Table V produce large abnormal returns, using holding periods out to 3 years.
Next we explore the robustness of these portfolio results by running monthly Fama-MacBeth firm-level cross-sectional regressions of stock returns on a strategic exporter (importer) dummy, and a host of additional firm-level control variables. We define strategic exporters and importers as in Table V , and run one-month ahead return forecasting regressions. We include the following firmlevel control variables: Market Equity, the Book-to-Market ratio, the past 1-month return, the past 12-month return, and the past 24-month stock return volatility. Panel A reports results for exports, and Panel B reports results for imports. As in Table III , we also include an alternative definition of firm-country ethnic links based on the presence of a connected board member; as before, we compute a variable called "Connected Board Member," which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a board member whose nationality is the same as the target country. estimates of 33 and 55 basis points, respectively. In Column 3, we test a particular hypothesis with regard to the import effect that we find, namely that local demand drives the import decision and subsequent high returns of strategic importers. We proxy for local demand using an indicator variable which takes a value of one if the firm has operations in less than five states (using data on the location of firm operations from Garcia and Norli (2010)) and its industry is a consumer industry, and zero otherwise. In Column 3 of Panel B we interact this variable with our strategic importer variable, and find that the interaction effect is negative; this suggests that local demand is unlikely to be driving the returns associated with strategic import decisions.
V. Additional Tests of the Mechanism
A. Migration Analysis Because U.S. census data do not allow us to measure geographical breakdown all ethnicities, in this analysis we use nation-level migration data to test whether imports and exports to countries that represent a higher portion of the immigrant stock in the U.S. predicts stock returns. Specifically, for each month, we calculate an import and export score as follows:
where Import itc is the value of imports within the last 12 months and Revenues it is the prorated revenues for the corresponding period. Migration c is the total number of immigrants from country C as of the beginning of the decade. Total
Migration is the sum of Migration c over all countries. These measures assign higher scores to firms that import (or export) more to countries that have more immigrants in U.S. In Table VII , we include this variable as a predictor of one month ahead future returns in addition to market value, book to market ratio, most recent month's return, momentum and total return volatility within the past 24 months. The results suggest that import score is statistically significant (t=2.31), but export score is not. A one standard deviation in import score (.0115) is associated with 5 basis points higher returns.
B. GDP Gap Analysis
In this section, we investigate whether information in firm level imports and exports predicts stocks returns through the differential growth of countries which may make imports (or exports) relatively more expensive or cheap. For example, if a firm is importing from Italy, and if Italy is growing faster than World GDP average growth, this would suggest Italian imports will be more expensive.
Therefore, firms that increase net imports (imports-exports) to Italy should experience less returns in the future. To test this idea, we first create a measure based on a firm's exposure to gap between trade partner's country's growth and average world growth for each calendar year:
where Net Import is the difference between Imports and Exports. Because the GDP data is reported annually, we estimate annual Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of stock returns of exporters and importers. Table VIII demonstrates that increasing the Weighted GDP Gap measure by one standard deviation (0.119) is associated with 196 basis points less returns in the following twelve months.
C. Analyst Attention to Information in Imports and Exports
In this section, we investigate whether information in the timing and amount of imports and exports signal future earnings, and to what extent such information affects analyst forecast bias. For this purpose, we first calculate a consensus analyst forecast value by averaging all analysts' most recent earnings forecast prior to every quarter earnings announcement. We then subtract this consensus earnings forecast from actual earnings and scale the difference by stock price one month prior to the earnings announcement date. We regress this forecast error on a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the firm has imported or exported within the last four quarter prior to current quarter for which the earnings are predicted. As control variables, we include market value of equity, book to market ratio, one-month and one-year return prior to the quarterly earnings announcement month, total volatility of stock returns within the prior 24 months, and a variable to capture how far the forecasts that constitute the consensus forecasts was away from the earnings announcement date (Average Forecast Age). In the second column we repeat the same analysis using the median, rather than the mean, of individual analyst forecasts to reduce the possible influence of extreme forecast errors. Table IX demonstrates that forecast errors of import and export firms are on average 3.4% higher than other firms, indicating that earnings of import/export firms are on average "underestimated".
D. Future Market Share Impacts of Imports and Exports
In our final piece of analysis, we investigate whether strategic importers and firms with board members who are connected to countries they are importing from on average gain more market share compared to their competitors. To do so, we first regress 12 month ahead market share of each firm on Strategic Importer and Connected Board Member dummies. We calculate the market share as percentage of sales within two digit NAICS code. Every month, we update the market share information based on the most available sales figure reported Income Statement. We run monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions and include Market Equity, Book to Market ratio, past 12-month return, and past 24-month return volatility as control variables. In Table X we present the results.
We find that strategic importers gain 0.30% more market share (t=4.59) twelve months after their strategic imports when compared to non-strategic importers.
Compared to the mean market share (2.42%) and median market share (8.84%), this impact appears economically quite large.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides new findings on how the first-order choice of international expansion, an issue faced by a substantial percentage of all firms, impacts firm values. In particular, we show that firms, on average, import and export significantly more with countries whose ethnic populations reside near the firm's location. This strategic trading behavior results in significant increases in market share for these firms. We show that although we can predict which trade links, on average, are valuable for firms using simple measures of connected population that are publicly available, the market seems to ignore this information. In particular, strategic importers and exporters outperform other importers and exporters by 10%-15% per year in risk-adjusted returns. The increased value of strategic traders is also missed by analysts, who consistently underestimate their earnings, resulting in significantly more positive earnings surprises for these firms.
We then provide additional evidence on the mechanism by showing that at times when the information network represents a more valuable link, specifically at times of tariff cuts and positive GDP shocks to the connected country, our effects are even larger. We show that one particular channel of the information network is through board members: a connected local population predicts more board members from that same country, and a significantly higher value for those strategic traders that also have connected board members.
While we focus on immigration and how demographic factors affect the import and export behavior of firms, we believe that our approach can be readily adapted to study other local advantage factors. Further, our empirical results have implications for a new, and potentially large, source of return predictability that helps give a richer picture of how information gets revealed into prices.
Lastly, our research provides new evidence on the economic impact of immigration and ethnic diversity in the United States. Immigrants' conduit roles in economic transactions almost surely stretch far beyond those we document in this paper.
Table I -Description of import/export data
This table presents summary statistics on the firms included in the tests. MVE is the market value of equity calculated as the price end of calendar year prior to fiscal year end multiplied by number of shares outstanding. B/M is the book to market ratio where the book value of equity is calculated as sum of stock holders equity (SEQ), Deferred Tax (TXDB), Investment Tax Credit (ITCB) minus Preferred Stock (PREF). Leverage is long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC), divided by the numerator plus market equity. Momentum is the twelve month return prior to fiscal year end. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly return in the last 24 months prior to fiscal year end. ROA (return on asset) earnings before tax and depreciation (EBITDA) scaled by total assets (TA). PPE/TA is the ratio of plant, property, and equity (PPENT) scaled by total assets. Unit of observation is firm-year. Panel A (B) reports the summary statistics for public firms, which exported (imported) at least once in a given year. The sample period covers 1994 to 2010. Panel C reports volume imports and exports in top 20 ports of United States. Product Import Ratio (PIR) is total amount a given firm imports from a foreign country in a given year scaled by total amount of imports of all U.S. public firms in the same year from the same country (I icpt /Sum(I ct )). Connected population is the number of residents in firm's headquarter state connected to export country scaled by total population in that state (CP ct ). Tariff Cut is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if U.S. reduces import tariff rate for product P from country C in year t-1, 0 otherwise. Tariff Jump is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if U.S. increases import tariff rate for product P from country C in year t-1, 0 otherwise. Standard errors, clustered by year, are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
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